Adetutu Ilori

Response X

When is comes to democratizing a state, the inexpensive and most popular approach is through elections, it cheaper to conduct and believed to be the stepping –stone to any democratic society. But history has shown that elections have not really advanced democracy in many Africa countries. There are many arguments that examine why this occurs in many African states, one argument supported in this week readings is that putting pressure on elections in a country will eventually led to a democratic state. The article by Lindberg advocates that for a democracy to be successful pressure must be put on the electoral process internally. Through participation and competition, allowing a multi-party system in the election and focusing more on the long-term effects of elections rather than short-term results. The other article by Branch and Cheeseman advocate that with lack of the necessary institutions elections in any country will be difficult, as seen in Kenya with the multiparty parliamentary elections. Although both arguments make valid points in terms of the institutions and the pressure needed to have an election that would forge the development of democracy in a country. It is necessary not to generalize when it comes to democracy in African countries despite its effective or ineffectiveness because democracy can be cultivated in any country regardless of the institutions and competitive nature of the elections in the country.

I think that these three words sum up democracy very well:

participation, competition and legitimacy.  These are the key elements in successful democracies.  It is truly a painstaking process in states that did not formerly have a type of democratic system.  In Lidburs article I  found this to be a great definition as well since we all know just holding elections – is butthe smallest portion of the process.  These elections have to be fair and of free will (meaning without coersion or vilent tactics and – they must be overseen by legitimate authorities to assure fairness and no corruption in order to be presumed FAIR or legitimate.  Lindburg says ”Democracy’s very core the electoral process enacts an important lund of distributive justice with regard to power and authority. In order to rule, the people must have some way of ruling, some procedure for making decisions that are binding for the members of the political community”.  This is what brings about a legitimate democracy as in “for the people, by the people”.  

As with the article  by Branch and Cheeseman, it takes time.  Democracy does not happen overnight.  I do think that the specifics with the Nigerian elections is the importance to “safety nets” for losers.  There has to be some type of security and reassurance for the losers.  Again, these are somewhat unstable areas and conflict is no stranger there, nor is rampid corruption.  The statistics Limdburg provides at the end of his article are interesting.  I think that by providing pressure from govt. and International groups (UN etc) and by holding multiparty-fair elections- it will continue to improve over time.

The two articles for today took different approaches to the question of democratization in Africa. Lindberg was much more optimistic, and was confident that any type of democracy and elections had enormous potential and should be viewed positively. Branch and Cheeseman on the other hand were a little bit more pessimistic, and they argued for the importance of sequencing, and the dangers of elite fragmentation, political liberalization, and state informalization.

Although they seem to be arguing for different sides in a debate over democratization, both articles raised good points. Lindberg correctly points out the importance of allowing people to vote for their representatives. He recognizes that at first many of these elections do not produce the desired results from those of us who are in favor of complete democratization, free and fair elections, and the protection of human rights. Despite their perceived failure, Lindberg points out that many scholars are looking at a snapshot picture of these states, and that their research does not capture the entire experience. He notes that usually within a couple of elections we can see many positive changes in these states and he credits these changes to the empowerment of the people through democracy and elections.

Branch and Cheeseman are a little bit more pessimistic, or maybe cautious about rapid democratization. They point to the many states that have tried to rapidly democratize and their failures. I agree with their position that political liberalization can produce many risks to the state and it causes many unintended side effects. In many cases the political parties revert back to old habits of clientelism, patronage politics, and ethnic divisions. This causes these states in many cases to take a couple of steps backward, and in some cases it has strengthened the position of the ruling party. But as we know, democracy is a messy process, and sometimes states have to take a couple of steps back in order for them to grow and to figure out what works best for them.

The main focus in our readings from Branch, Cheeseman, and Lindberg was institutional reform will help secure elections and increase the possibility of a long standing, stable democracy in African countries. 

Lindberg’s argument was more about letting African, multi-party elections to continue, just because they aren’t as successful and democratic as the international community would like them to be, does not mean that they won’t evolve and eventually stabilize into the western view of democracy.  I think the most important thing to take away from this argument is that multi-party elections are important in a democracy, however these repeated high risk, ethnically involved elections are not going to stabilize themselves without internal change.  The necessity of a safety net for the losers of the election is a great point brought by the Cheeseman and Branch reading.  In order for these elections to be successful, everyone involved needs to feel as if they will be protected and benefit from the elections, even if they are not the winners.

I agreed more with the Cheeseman and Branch argument.  They believe that the structure of government needs to be changed and stabilized in order to have a successful, nonviolent set of elections.  “Without certain prerequisites such as basic state capacity, the effective rule of law, and an agreed national identity the reintroduction of multi-partyism may exacerbate underlying tensions which the state is powerless to manage”.  The clear ethnic tension in nations like Kenya will not necessarily succeed in having these elections without more stability and sense of security from their government.  The argument made regarding decentralization and privatization of violence, along with elite fragmentation and state informalization don’t allow the government, what should be the center of power, any actual chance to effectively rule the population.  This causes no trust or sense of unity as a whole nation, making violence after elections more plausible.

Democracy in Africa’s Post-Conflict States

Kwesi W. Obeng (African Agenda)–From Angola to Sierra Leone, Rwanda to Guinea Bissau and Congo DR to Mozambique, two defining elements unite all peace agreements brokered after the Cold War to end civil wars in Africa. The trend runs round the world, from Bosnia to El Salvador and Afghanistan to East Timor. Liberal democracy and free market systems are two elements fastened to the heart of states recovering from violent conflicts, ostensibly to assist these countries make the transition to peace from a state of anarchy and bloodbath.

Indeed, fundamental values of the global agenda in the last two decades have hinged on multi-party democracy and laissez faire capitalism. Weaving democracy and free market economy into peace agreements are based on a number of assumptions. Democracy, unlike other forms of governance, has inherent checks and balances to mitigate the inclination to resort to violence to resolve political differences. Central to the assumption underlining free market economy is that markets (and not states) are better guarantors of development (defined as material prosperity) for all because, adherents argue, the benefits will trickle down even to the weakest and most disadvantaged in society. But it is also the case that multi-party democracy and free market are the dominant political and economic models of development in the new world order, in which there’s substantively still only one global policeman.

Legitimacy
Historically, there have been many forms of legitimacy but surely in the 21st century, the only serious form of legitimacy is democracy. Thus, multi-party elections are today about the only internationally acceptable route to power. However, elections have turned out to be one of the ways to appease top echelons of feuding factions to a conflict in states rebuilding after long periods of civil war. In effect, elections may produce outcomes that may be described as ‘democratic’ but may not necessarily lead to peace or development.

Many studies around the world have established links between development and democracy. However, the causal relationship, if any, between Africa’s marginally improved economic performance and the democratisation wave that swept across Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s and the early years of the 21st century remain a hugely contested issue. Nevertheless, the value and significance of open, free and fair elections in countries transitioning from conflict to peace or consolidation of peace can hardly be underestimated. Successful political and governance transition is central to any post-conflict nation-building project. Rebuilding public institutions such as roads, hospitals, schools, law courts, prisons and regulatory agencies is fundamental to sustainability of the state.
Appeasement
True, the constitution-making process after violent conflict offers a distinct opportunity to create a sense of common vision of the future of the state and even a ‘road map’ on how to get there. Accordingly, the constitution of these troubled African countries, of which a good number are slowly recovering, were partly peace agreements and partly a framework setting out the rules by which the new form of governance, democracy, will hinge.

Elections lend sought-after credibility to the leadership and institutions that emerge to replace structures imposed on the country and its population during the conflict and in the case of Africa, many of these wars span across decades and run deep. Angola’s war, fought over 27 years, ended in 2002, Mozambique’s 17-year-old war come to an end in 1992 with the Rome General Peace Accords and Liberia and Sierra Leone’s hot wars ended in 2001 and 2002 respectively. All were followed by multi-party elections.
Elections serve more than one purpose especially in the post-conflict context. Aside providing legitimacy and international credibility to post-conflict administrations, they also encourage democratic values such as tolerance and inclusiveness. Elections also help mark formal end of conflicts and promote state-building after bitter conflicts. But in Liberia, as in Congo DR and Sierra Leone, an earlier general election in 1997 failed to end the conflict. The chief architect of the Liberian war, Charles Taylor, emerged president of the war-battered country after the 1997 elections. However, the ex-rebel leader’s presidency was short-lived as a new rebel faction, the Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), militarily challenged President Taylor’s democratic dictatorship. Amos Sawyerr, the former President of Liberia’s Interim Government puts the 1997 election shenanigans and Taylor’s reign most succinctly when he said: ‘The state we produced turned out to be a criminal state, legitimized by elections’.

Economy
In 2007, Sierra Leone held its second post-conflict elections in which the opposition party candidate, Ernest Bai Koroma won in a tight run-off. The immediate past president, Ahmed Tijan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) handed over the reins of power to the All Peoples Congress (APC) led by President Bai Koroma. Koroma beat Kabbah’s vice president and flagbearer of the SLPP, Solomon Berewa. The smooth transition marked the first time ever of a peaceful and democratic handover of power from one political party to another in the country’s history.

Koroma’s job is cut out. The reconstruction of the country has focused on organization of elections and re-training of the security agencies. Yet, the economic disempowerment and political exclusion of the youth, graft and unfettered influence of traditional authorities constitute three of the key factors that triggered the violent outburst that engulfed the country. Three-fourths of Sierra Leone’s 5.2 million people, most them being the youth, are jobless.

One of the greatest failures of democratisation and state-building in Sierra Leone, but also in Liberia, Guinea Bissau, Angola, Mozambique and Congo DR, has been on the economic front. Mismanagement of public resources is widespread, while majority of the people live in squalor. With the exception of Guinea Bissau and Mozambique, the rest of these post-war countries are well-endowed with natural resources including oil, diamond, iron ore, platinum and cobalt. Prices of these commodities were at phenomenal levels until they started slipping from the middle of 2008.

The UNDP Human Development Index (2007/2008) ranks Sierra Leone 176 out of 177 countries. At 40.5 years, life expectancy in Sierra Leone is even below the African average, seven years after the war ended there.

Angola, Africa’s fastest growing economy ranks 162, yet the country’s economy has been expanding at a phenomenal pace – an annual average of about 19 per cent since 2000. As Africa’s leading oil exporter, Angola raked in billions of dollars during the spike in oil prices but the dos Santos MPLA-government is corrupt, incompetent and wasteful.
Transparency International, the anti-corruption watchdog, rates Angola as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. There is next to no investment in the larger rural population and basic infrastructure beyond Luanda, the national capital any wonder Angolans feel terribly disillusioned.

Other development indicators for Sierra Leone are equally stark. Sierra Leone’s agricultural sector provides about three-fourths of jobs however, the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme trained ex-combatants as plumbers, carpenters and mechanics. In spite of its centrality to Sierra Leone’s recovery, only a handful opted for life in agriculture as the incentives for resettlement were comparatively far worse than for those settled as plumbers, carpenters or mechanics. At its peak, the reconstruction was costing the United Nations some US$16.4 billion and the British government US$150 million a year.

The democracy dividend promised at the end of the war in 2002 remains a mirage for the bulk of the population. Bretton Woods institutions and other donors’ insistence on liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation of public goods with next to no social safety net for even the most vulnerable, has also complicated the rebuilding of the country’s infrastructure which were all damaged or destroyed during the conflict.

It was thought that spearheading reconstruction agenda with democratisation alongside liberalised markets would address the fundamental causes of the war, which includes institutional weakness, endemic corruption, youth alienation and abysmal human rights records as well as promote productivity and innovation.
This has yet to happen in many of these post-conflict states. Cote d’Ivoire, the Central African Republic and Congo-Brazaville and Niger remain extremely volatile. Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone and Liberia are sitting on knife-edge as a surging trade in narcotics from Latin America takes hold along the West African coast. Congo DR has fractured with dissident rebels fighting the Kinshasa government of President Joseph Kabila. In spite of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and elections in the south of the country, Sudan is at war as the genocide continues in the Darfur region of the country. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is set to indict the Sudanese president on war crime charges.

It is not completely bleak. Although the rebel Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) leader, Paul Kagame, remains in charge as president of the country after he was returned through an election, the country has remarkably remade itself after the 1994 genocide.
Indeed, in some specific aspect of liberal democracy, economic freedom and popular participation in politics, the tiny East African country is a world leader. Women in Rwanda now lead the world rankings of women in national parliaments, with 49 per cent of representation compared to a world average of just about 15 per cent.

As part of the country’s new constitution drafted after 1994, 24 of the 80 seats in the lower house of parliament are reserved for women. Also reserved for women are six out of the 20 in the upper house.
The breakthrough in Rwanda is partly the result of intense lobby by women, the civil war and women’s involvement in drafting the new constitution and voting guidelines that guaranteed seats for women candidates. In sync with international targets, Mozambique and South Africa, two countries transitioning from a long history of civil strife, women hold at least 30 per cent of the seats in parliament.

In 2005, Africa got its first female president. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf rose to power in a keenly contested election in Liberia after former president Charles Taylor was forced out of office. Taylor is now facing trial at the ICC in The Hague for his government’s material support to the murderous Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels who reduced Sierra Leone to a failed state in the brutal decade-long war.

The symbolism of these strides by (women in) African countries recovering from war is significant but it’s far from generating sufficient momentum to shape the mix of economic and social policies to address the structural imbalance and reform institutional practices that consign majority of women to the periphery and penury.

The more plausible question, perhaps, is what impacts are (or would) these developments have on the quality of life of ordinary citizens, especially women and evolution of democratic norms in these countries.

It is noteworthy that African countries which have recorded a significant improvement in women’s participation in governance have done so through adoption of quota systems. This has not necessarily translated into better living conditions for women and their dependants. More specifically, it is not guaranteed that these women would necessarily pursue policies that benefit the majority of women. Suffice to state, however, that it may level the playing field on which women battle for equality.

But quite a number of studies in Africa and elsewhere show that where women are actively involved in the crafting and implementation of development strategies, they are more likely to succeed and the benefits are also more direct – families are better fed, healthier, and their income, savings and investments go up, than if they were forced to the periphery.

Economic policies foisted on these same fragile nations by the international community undermine marginal progress made on the political front in these countries. The implementation of unmitigated neo-liberal threesome policy dictum of liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation have further perpetuated the injustices of the past including pricing basic services such as healthcare, education and sanitation above the reach of the most disadvantaged.

Democratisation has led to an explosion of media. But it is still dangerous for journalists to work in host of these countries. In February 2009, four Sierra Leonean female journalists were subjected to an extraordinary attack – abducted, stripped naked and forced to march through the streets of the eastern city of Kenema – for reporting on an anti-Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) campaign on the international day of zero tolerance for female circumcision. Kenema saw some of the worst atrocities during the Sierra Leone civil war. According to the United Nations, up to 94 per cent of women aged 15–49 in Sierra Leone suffer FGM.

Such impunity undermines the tenets of democracy of which freedom of speech and other basic human rights are intrinsic. Blatant violation of the rights of others is not uncommon. This is complicated by widespread corruption, joblessness and insecurity. These can only serve as fodder for instability in fragile democracies as Sierra Leone and many other transitioning countries on the continent.

Rwanda’s steady progress at democratic governance since the 1994 massacre, the Kagame administration is turning out to be one of the most repressive democratic regimes in East Africa. Critical media are ruthlessly closed down, journalists arbitrarily arrested and thrown in jail or forced to flee the country. New media law in the offing limits freedom of speech and criminalises the media for criticising the President or the army.
The legislation is ‘not a law but a death sentence for journalism in this country’, president of the Association of Rwandan Journalists, Gaspard Safari, has described it. Safari is the editor of the Umuvugizi, a leading private Kinyarwanda-language newspaper.

Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Liberia have instituted reconciliation commissions as a way to heal wounds opened by their wars. Charles Taylor is facing trial at the International Court of Justice in Hague for his involvement in the conflict in Sierra Leone. Some other high profile war criminals died (Sam Hinga Norman, General Mosquito and Foday Sankoh) before courts set up to try them passed judgment.

The challenge facing these post-conflict transition countries is indeed how to balance the competing demands to translate the peace into concrete development that benefits ordinary people on the streets.

Africa states generally lack the necessary capacity or the will to effectively perform core functions of statehood. For post-war recovery African states the crisis is dire and urgent: many are unwilling or simply unable to provide basic public services such as governing legitimately, ensuring physical security, fostering sustainable and equitable economic growth as well as other essential public goods such as clean water, affordable health care, schools, roads and decent jobs. The high level of youth unemployment is a major challenge to the security and development of these fragile countries.

For Sierra Leone, the reinstatement of the chieftaincy institution complicates the situation as it feeds into growing resentment and discontent against government and para-state institutions. Paramount chiefs are accused of injustices, non-transparency and unaccountability especially in the countryside. They were heavily implicated in the war itself.

But in the face of the unending global economic crisis, the task of rebuilding and consolidating the minimal political and socio-economic progress appear most daunting indeed. These post-conflict countries depend on Western countries for more than half of their capital expenditure budgets. Worse still, prices of commodities exported by these weak states have plummeted sharply in the last half-year impacting heavily on their revenue reserves. It is now feared that some all of these countries could actually slip into the abyss.

In the last 12 months alone there have been democratic reversals in African countries including Guinea and Mauritania. High food prices triggered violent street protests across the continent, from Liberia to Cameroon. Dozens died in these riots and attempts to quell the protests narrowed rather than expanded the frontiers of freedom and democracy. The creeping narcotic shipment in transit to Europe through some of these post-conflict states poses perhaps the severest danger to the expansion of the frontiers of democracy and development in Africa.

In spite of the challenges above, it is still fair to conclude that democracy is steadily taking root in many of these traumatised countries. It is inevitable, however, that in the pursuit of the ideal governance system, these countries do not overlook the socio-economic component of the post-war recovery agenda.

    I was really happy that both articles this week are much more recent.  We don’t often get to analyze many articles from more recent years and or even current events.    Branch & Cheeseman-  I do think that all states can become democratic- but to do so there needs to be a consensus of the majority that this is in the best interest of the state …or possibly have a dictatorship that is willing to adapt to a more democratic system- which is unlikely.  As we have seen repeatedly throughout history, although some dictator regimes can maintain peace or even provide for the people, many other plunder their countries into states of great despair both economically( while lining their own pockets) and also by depriving their citizens of many things including jobs, proper access to medicines, housing and other basic needs.  I do feel that democracy is the answer. 

    To achieve this- I agree with the Branch and Cheeseman article- it takes more than just holding elections. It does not happen overnight.  It takes time and trial and error, in most cases to reform a system of any kind.   There has to be institutional changes that are favorable to democratic fundamentalism.   Liberalization is risky but under many regimes, these systems do not usually grow to benefit the people, but rather continue to increase the wealth of the corrupt leaders who in turn, end up being ousted –eventually.  When this continues, as we have seen in the past few years- it comes to a boiling point with the states of repression. I hope that this happens with Mugabe soon. 

    In newly democratic areas, with regards to elections- historically there has been many debatable outcomes- and in these situations, violence and conflicts over the results are usually the result.  It is also in these more repressed and devastated countries where this is likely.  (usually where corruption has long existed) Decentralization of former institutions- corrupt or not, also takes time. 

We have seen these Post-election conflicts in DRC, Zimbabwe, Cote d’Iviore,  Rwanda, Liberia, Guinea, Mauratania, Sierra Leone, Kenya and many- more.  I think it takes the U.N and other International groups to provide security and transitional assistance -which takes time.

You can not just build a house on top of the ground and expect it to withstand the elements…you must first lay a solid foundation and then build upon that- this will enable it to stand strong and remain long- providing that you do a little maintenance regularly, otherwise- parts can become warn, damaged and weaken and eventually- if not repaired, it can cause further erosion or even collapse.  So first- lay that solid foundation and gradually build a strong house and for goodness sakes- do the maintenance. lol

The theme of these two articles is the potential for democratization. Although, both articles have no intention of denying the possibility they take different views on how to sustain a legitimate democracy.

Lindberg is an optimist when it comes to democratizing in Africa. He proposes that elections in Africa have had an element of stability if looked at over time. This stability is a good underpinning for elections and over more time things seem to be improving. He mentions how turnovers of parties is becoming more common, this frequency actually gives legitimacy to the elections. Looking back on Dahl’s model (presented to us in class) we see that most African countries have taken the middle path to democracy i.e. participation and contestation rise at similar rate. This has seemed to not work out for African countries, but it seems that this path just takes time to level out and Lindberg seems hopeful that if the quality of elections continues to be high that we can expect to see well established, fair, free democracies in Africa.

Branch and Cheeseman it seems are less optimistic, but they do a good job of explaining why they are skeptical. They note that the precariousness of African multiparty states comes from elite fragmentation, state informalization and historical grievances. This instability could be avoided if proper institutions were in place, what they call “institutional safe nets” but often times that isn’t the case. These safety nets are supposed to keep violence in check when you have high party contestation and high voter turnout. They advise other African countries to learn this lesson from Kenya, because it could lead to similar results.

Word Count: (275)

A big emphasis in class on Tuesday was that “Elections = Democracy.”  I would say this is a fair argument.  I think if we asked a class of middle schoolers what makes a democracy that “freedom” and “elections” would be the two most popular answers.  This is what is instilled in us from a young age.  We live a free country where we get to pick our leaders and that is what makes us better than everywhere else in the world, right?
Branch/Cheeseman and Lindberg are making different arguments in regards to multiparty elections.  Lindburg believes that we need to stick with elections and continue to apply pressure to African countries in elections in order for them to improve.  Branch/Cheeseman, on the other hand, see elections to be dangerous if not changed.   They believe that, especially in a place like Africa, elections need to change to better suit the needs of the people.  Not changing the elections can lead to violence.

As for me, I’m more convinced by Branch/Cheeseman.  I do not believe in “one-size-fits-all” politics.  In order for democracy to work in other places, it needs to be tweaked to suit their needs.  We live in a country that has been relatively stable for hundreds of years.  In Africa, this is not so much the case.  Democracy is a first step for them at some sort of stability and at first, they may need to alter their democratic processes in order to have a system that works for their history and their lands.  I think the problem is that most people see democracy as solely America and forget to think about the fact that it can happen in other countries.  We believe it is our way or the highway.  I can honestly say that growing up I thought that America was the only country that was a democracy.

(308 words)

Does the enforcement of elections in country in the long run lead to a strong democracy? That is the question that is brought up in these articles. Lindburg discusses how multi party elections that may even been corrupt, in the long run improves the conditions of a democracy. This seems like a little farfetched of an idea. I agree that elections are a big stepping stone to the improvement of a democracy but I just feel unfair elections that are happening for a long period of time doesn’t strengthen anything. This procedural way of thinking isn’t uncommon and many believe it to be true but I agree more with the Cheeseman and Branch article. Institutional changes lead to the betterment of a transitioning government. By making bigger changes like these it improves the methods of voting and makes the government more stable. People like Lindberg might believe that with constant multi party elections will come institutional changes but I believe that is the backwards way of thinking it. People constantly are questioning why many African countries haven’t succeeded with democracies and maybe it’s because there is never really an institutional change in the government. Procedures like elections are a big deal but why so many strong democracies have been successes is because of good institutions. If this is enforced in African countries over the next few years I would be curious to see the outcome.
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When asked what about the definition of democracy, most people (especially from the West) would have an answer that involved some sort of elections. Elections Elections, Elections, makes a democracy. But sometimes I think we put a little too much emphasis on elections. Simply holding elections does not create a democracy, but as Branch and Cheeseman discuss, transforming institutions as well create for a better democracy. Elections, held over time, create an environment for the betterment of a democracy, but are all elections good elections??? Can unfair elections lead to the betterment of democracy?

Lindburg talks about how in order for democracy to improve elections, multiparty elections, have to be continuous and pressure must be maintained. The focus on elections seems a bit troubling to me but Lindburg makes a good argument. Just because we don’t see effective results from the beginning doesn’t mean that we should give up on creating democracies in African states.

Branch and Cheeseman go in to a more specific detail about the dangers of multiparty elections without institutional changes that need to take place. It is not fair to generalize that democracy simply won’t work in Africa, but the steps that African countries need to take in order to democratize involve institution transformations that have not happened in Africa. Without these institutional changes, elections can revive underlying problems that exist.

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