Well, to begin with, I had to rework some areas of the paper so that it could be coherent to make it readable to the reader. I did this by providing a little bit more context to the some of the existing parts, and I hope that the additions will help to make it easily readable.
Secondly I had to cite the paper to evidence some of the huge claims I was making in it. this was the most demanding task as it kept me awake for a considerable period of time.
Coupled with some other assignments for other classes, it was a little bit challenging to meet the deadline. I submitted my paper three days late, and I thank Professor Kendhammer for his indulgence to let me keep working on the paper beyond the deadline.
In any nation the link between democratization (in its numerous meanings) and resources is found, in many respects, and in fact attaches itself to issues related to nationalism, identity and the quest for self-determination. For nationalism has always been a political claim (Brubaker 2004), and considering the fact that these claims are not sober or value-neutral but determined by a people’s desire to control territory and the wealth found in it, then the Tanganyika-Zanzibar question and the dangers it poses to the country’s democracy -and more importantly its Union – could be surmised as part of peripheral nationalism in which the likelihood of secession is greater.
Borrowing from Barber (1995), the Jihad (in his created meaning referring to ethnicity and ethnic tendencies) and the McWorld (market and technological forces) would not avail any territory or its people to any of their desired form(s) of democracy – the best possible form of government. And once secession happens it might entice other resource-abundant regions within the country to follow the same path. The problem then is whether or not the seceded states will be able to sustain themselves! Now the market and the nationalistic sentiments have converged, and in all, would overwhelm the nation. How would Tanganyika look like after the demise of the Union? How would Zanzibar look like, as well? These ethnic and market forces that have increased with free market ideas will lead to a more chaotic route than what the people and world would prefer.
Defending oneself can sometimes take a toll on you, but all of a sudden a novel idea could come from nowhere to help out in such situations. That being said, I have been struggling to find an event that would link the idea of identity to resources. The geographical connection between the two can always be easily defended, but the religious and ethnic ones prove a little harder to tackle.
Yet I remembered an event that I could use for my paper. The 1992 Zanzibar’s attempt to Unilaterally join the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). This action was even blessed by the then Union President Ali Hassan Mwinyi. A Zanzibari himself, Mwinyi and other Zanzibaris defended the move as saying that OIC is not a religious organization; they wanted Zanzibar to join it in order to tap economic benefits that the organization offers. Most importantly, the OIC clearly stipulated in its mission that Islam is its main focus – thus Zanzibar’s desire to join OIC was both religious and a matter of (Islamic) identity.
Until today the Zanzibar-OIC issue is regularly invoked as to whether or not Zanzibar reserves a diplomatic autonomy to act on matters beyond national borders. The matter was shut down by the Union parliament when it declared the move unconstitutional as Zanzibar’s autonomy does not transcend Union boarders.
I was reading this book by Julius Nyerere titled Our Leaders and the Destiny of Tanzania and I was intrigued by his ambivalence about the fate of the country’s Union. He warned that personal greed and ignorance concerning the Union and its numerous issues drive people to arrive at wild conclusions. The primary architect of the Union himself who favored Unity and ‘sacrificed’ Tanganyika’s autonomy for reasons not well known, this opinion of his was a surprise to me.
But what he was essentially arguing is the fact that after his leadership, the next presidents had put less emphasis on unity – or superficially emphasize on it for their own benefits and that of their cleavages. To some extent, the book was a response to the attempted re-formation of Tanganyika in 1993 when a group of 55 members of parliament (G55) proposed a private motion to reclaim Tanganyika back.
This narrative should feature in my paper, now that I am still revising it.
What I submitted as first draft of my paper to Professor Kendhammer and colleagues for review was quite unfinished. I wrote it half way and in order to meet the deadline I had to rush the other half. Thus, having rushed writing the second part, I had to make a tough decision: removing all references pending review and effecting any corrections to be suggested.
I am currently reading the paper over again, especially the rushed parts so I can fix some self-detected mistakes and correct some more after I receive feedback from the Professor and my classmates. This includes making sure that there is a consistent flow of the material and a clear demarcation between facts and their interpretation in relation to the topic I am presenting.
So far, my paper is half way and I will be working tonight and tomorrow to get the first draft done despite the tight schedule I am trying to conquer. Reading the introduction again, I get surprised how ‘vague’ I was in the beginning. I created some kind of an analogy, a proposition put otherwise, that I think would help interpret the material I will be presenting in subsequent sections. It emphasizes on the need for an educated public and the obligation to do so in order to strengthen a country’s democracy. The education emphasized here includes formal and civic education.
It is expected that with education people will develop political consciousness needed for active democracy. However, as a self-critique I think that no single government would truly invest in honestly educating its people who would challenge it later on. Restricting the populace in absolute terms is also more challenging. It happens, then, that both through school and civic education most governments create an agenda to be cultivated into peoples’ minds in order to win support for the existing regime.
This analogy repeats itself, though in a different way, partially through the suggestions I make towards the end of the paper. I basically say that once the people are knowledgeable about the benefits of the Tanzania Union and are capable to engage in and make informed decision as to where their country should go, the Union will emerge stronger and will survive any dangers that are currently threatening its existence.
The death of a nation results in the creation of another, with perhaps new if not modified goals, but all in all to identify themselves as a people. The new nation(s), however, are not guaranteed an easy success. We have seen South Sudan, for example, still struggling to put the dots together. Things could get messier as was the case with Somalia since 1991 after the fall of Mohamed Siad Barre.
Should this happen to the Tanzania Union, it means we’d welcome the rebirth of two nations – Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Some people would question my wording here as to whether Tanganyika and Zanzibar, as separate states, would really be new in world politics. This is a contentious matter, with its solution depending on the lenses one would use to look at it.
The future, however, is not guaranteed. Evidence exists to support the case that once separation occurs, it will perpetually haunt the community to infinity. There could happen further attempts at secession and the anticipated economic prosperity will be far away to be realized in a short run. In regard to the Tanganyika-Zanzibar situation, there exists the danger of further claims for the dissatisfied Pemba island to seek autonomy from independent Zanzibar. Moreover there could happen struggles between the Arab and Indian-like Zanzibaris and dark ones. Tanganyika too is not immune to those problems.
This is what I mean by the nation’s complex future as I posted in last week’s journal in the concluding section. Subject to changes as they’d deem fit, I will adopt this model in concluding my paper. Suggestions are welcome.
In my second journal post, if class members still remember, I gave a partial outline of what my paper should be like. I’ll take off from there today, now that the outline is fully developed. I’ll definitely add three more sections to the existing conceptualization.
Departing from the survey of multi-party politics and its orientation since 1992, I’ll now examine the inter- and intra- workings and relationships among political parties. In brief, this section will include the accusations of regional concentration and religious bias that the ruling party has been trading on the country’s opposition, plus the reality on the ground. A speculation on reasons for such accusations and the impact thereof will be looked into.
Next section will be about popular support and identity for parties and the country’s numerous agenda. The resource question will be implicitly mainstreamed here – I’ll argue that the politics of profit and loss, for lack of a better expression, is the major reason for identity formation and agenda support.
A section before conclusion will survey some instances in which empirical evidence regarding the several cases I would make in the foregoing sections of the paper. I’ll tentatively call this section: incentives for election misconducts and recurring violence. It will cover some major happenings from the first multiparty election in 1995 until the last one held in the year 2010.
Lastly, I’ll discuss Tanzania’s complex future. While the possibilities of national reconfigurations are quite meager as of now –the time when the country’s incumbent party remains highly influential – with piling grievances in both Zanzibar and Tanganyika, there’s one day when the party shall go, and an excruciating political restructuring will likely haunt the country and its revered Union.
I have been struggling with finding sources for one argument I’m trying to make in my paper. It is that, while the change of political parties in a country is deemed necessary in fostering democracy and good governance, the same doesn’t guarantee a successful democracy. The dangers of one party staying in power for too long is well know -for instance, incumbent parties could get used to power and in many ways forget about their subjects. This has happened almost all over the world and especially in poor countries: from Alberto Fujimori’s alleged mining-friendly laws, an action that robbed off a majority Peruvians mineral wealth, to Congo’s unending mess since the 1960s.
My worry though is that a mere change of political parties without cultivating the necessary democratic culture amongst the people would make a country even worse than it was. This has happened in Malawi and Zambia, for example, when massive corruption and embezzlement of public funds under Presidents Bakili Muluzi and Frederick Chiluba, respectively, was way beyond what the people had experienced prior to democratization in the 1990s. These democratically-elected leaders even opted to turn into dictators by attempting to change their countries’ constitutions to allow them to run for third and subsequent presidential terms. Muluzi tried to do this in the year 2002 but the Malawi National Assembly turned him down. The story goes on and on.
However, I find myself unable to find other sources aside these historical analogies, which I’m convinced that they do help -but are insufficient to make a strong case. Please help!